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Abstract.  
This paper sets up an overlapping generations general equilibrium model with incomplete markets 
similar to Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger's (2009) and uses it to simulate a policy reform which replaces 
an optimal at tax with an optimal non-linear tax that is allowed to be arbitrarily age and history 
dependent. The reform shifts labor supply toward productive households and thereby increases 
aggregate productivity. This leads to a large increase in per capita consumption and a moderate increase 
in per capita hours. Under a utilitarian social welfare function that places equal weight on all current 
and future cohorts, the implied welfare gain amounts to more than 10% in lifetime consumption 
equivalents.1 Introduction
In modern societies, income taxation by the government plays two bene￿cial roles: it raises
revenue for funding public goods and provides social insurance by redistributing from the
fortunate to the unfortunate. The associated cost is that taxes negatively a￿ect current
and future production possibilities by discouraging labor supply and investment. An impor-
tant goal in macroeconomics and public ￿nance is to understand how these forces are best
balanced given a well-de￿ned notion of social welfare.
In a recent series of papers, Conesa and Krueger (2006) and Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger
(2009) provide a quantitative answer to this question using a dynamic general equilibrium
model that incorporates many of the relevant ingredients, such as endogenous labor supply,
capital accumulation, life cycles, and uninsurable idiosyncratic wage risk with an empirically
plausible structure. In doing so, Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (CKK hereafter) solve for the
optimal tax system under a set of restrictions that rule out dependence on age or income
histories as well as certain types of non-linearities. Their ￿ndings broadly support Hall and
Rabushka’s (1995) proposal that labor income be taxed at a moderate, ￿at rate with a ￿xed
deduction per household, although they also ￿nd signi￿cant gains from taxing capital income
for reasons due to Erosa and Gervais (2002).
Although CKK’s analysis is an important benchmark, the restrictions they impose on
the set of tax instruments are not quite ideal. A general issue is that these restrictions limit
the government’s choice set in a way that seems somewhat arti￿cial given the presence of
age/history dependence in the current U.S. tax code (through social security), which of course
cannot help enhance the performance of the ￿optimal￿ tax system. But in addition to this,
there is also a speci￿c theoretical reason to suspect that they create a positive and possibly
signi￿cant loss in this instance. This derives from several recent studies, collectively referred
to as the New Dynamic Public Finance (NDPF) by Kocherlakota (2009), which theoretically
examine the optimal structure of labor and asset income taxes when they are allowed to be
arbitrarily non-linear and age/history dependent. Two lessons that have emerged from this
literature are that optimal taxes are: (i) non-separable in current labor and asset income
with negative cross partial derivatives; and (ii) history dependent as well when wages are
random and persistent as in CKK’s model (Albanesi and Sleet, 2006, Golosov and Tsyvinski,
2006, Kocherlakota, 2005). The ￿at tax whose optimality obtains under CKK’s restrictions
has neither property.
To assess the quantitative signi￿cance of this observation, this paper sets up a model
similar to CKK’s and uses it to quantify the welfare gain from replacing CKK’s optimal ￿at
tax with an optimal non-linear tax that is allowed to be arbitrarily age and history dependent.
1The gain turns out to be large: under a utilitarian social welfare function that places equal
weight on all current and future cohorts, it is worth more than a 10 percent increase in
consumption for every household at all dates and contingencies. This gain mostly comes
from higher per capita consumption and shorter per capita hours. These improvements are
supported by a massive shift of labor supply toward productive households, which e￿ectively
increases aggregate productivity.
The main technical challenge in carrying out this analysis is computational, and CKK in
fact cite this as a primary reason for formulating the problem the way they did:
Ideally one would impose no restrictions on the set of tax functions the govern-
ment can choose from. Maximization over such an unrestricted set is computa-
tionally infeasible, however. (Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger, 2009, p. 34)
This paper confronts this challenge by analytically simplifying the unrestricted optimal tax
problem before resorting to numerics. The procedure has three steps: The ￿rst step follows
the NDPF by using mechanism design and Kocherlakota’s (2005) implementation result to
reduce the problem to a ￿ctitious social planning problem which maximizes social welfare
subject to resource and incentive constraints. The second step then establishes a theoret-
ical result which further reduces this planning problem to a ￿partial equilibrium￿ dynamic
mechanism design problem without capital. This eliminates the intractability of the former
that comes from the model’s general equilibrium structure. The third step wraps up by
applying a recursive method devised by Fukushima and Waki (2009) to tame the curse of
dimensionality that comes from wage persistence.
There are several recent papers that also use mechanism design to address quantitative
questions on optimal taxation, but do so using partial equilibrium models without capital and
with stylized forms of wage risk. 1 An early paper by Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006) studies the
optimal structure of disability insurance using a model in which agents are subject to a two-
state shock sequence (disabled or not), where disability is an absorbing state. A more recent
paper by Huggett and Parra (2010) speaks to the optimal structure of tax systems more
generally, but they are able to use mechanism design only when households experience no
wage risk after entering the labor market. Weinzierl (2008) employs a model with persistent
wage risk but in a setting with at most three periods. This paper therefore expands the
1An interesting outlier is Farhi and Werning (2009), who use a model with a general structure that allows
for capital accumulation and arbitrary forms of labor market risk. They focus on a partial reform which
keeps the labor allocation intact and ￿nd that it generates a modest welfare gain (relative to a benchmark
allocation that resembles what is currently observed in the U.S.). This paper considers a ￿full￿ reform which
allows for labor reallocations and ￿nds that there are potentially large gains from doing so. On the other
hand, this conclusion is more model-dependent than Farhi and Werning’s.
2technological frontier of this literature by making it possible to handle general equilibrium
models with capital accumulation and richer, empirically better motivated speci￿cations of
wage risk. This bridges a gap between this literature and the quantitative incomplete markets
literature, and is, in my view, intrinsically valuable as well given the plausible importance
of these elements in assessing how tax systems are best structured.
2 Model
The model is almost identical to CKK’s, except for: (i) the fact that the government is given
access to a richer set of tax instruments; and (ii) several technical di￿erences that make the
model mathematically better behaved.
Environment. Time ￿ows t = 1;2;3;:::, and in each period a measure (1 + )t 1 of






where cj and lj are its consumption and hours of work at age j, respectively. Here, U(c;l) =
u(c)   v(l), where u0,  u00, v0, and v00 are all non-negative and v is isoelastic.
At each age j, a household draws an idiosyncratic skill shock j from a ￿nite set j  R++,
which enables it to transform lj units of labor into nj = jlj units of e￿ective labor. For
technical reasons I assume that nj is bounded from above by a large constant nmax. The
skill shock process is ￿rst order Markov and has strictly positive transition probabilities.
Households also face skill-independent mortality risk, and  j denotes the probability of
survival between ages j   1 and j. The distribution of both shocks across households is
i.i.d. and satis￿es the law of large numbers. Let j  (1;:::;j) 2 j  1    j
and 
j
i  (i;:::;j) 2 
j
i  i    j, and let j denote the joint density of survival
and skill draws. The measure of age j households in period t with skill history j is then
jt(j) = (1 + )t jj(j).
The technology is described by the aggregate resource constraint
Ct + Kt+1   (1   )Kt + Gt  F(Kt;Nt) (1)
for each t, where the initial capital stock K1 is given. Here, Ct is aggregate consumption, Kt
is the capital stock, Nt is aggregate e￿ective labor, Gt = (1+)t 1G is an exogenous expense
on public goods,  is the depreciation rate of capital, and F : R2
+ ! R+ is a constant-returns-
3to-scale (CRS) aggregate production function which is increasing, concave, and continuously
di￿erentiable. Using CRS, let ^ r(K=N)  FK(K;N)    and ^ w(K=N)  FN(K;N). The
Inada conditions lim!0 ^ r() = 1 and lim!1 ^ r() =   hold.
Allocations. An allocation is a sequence x = ((cjt;njt)J
j=1;Kt)1
t=1, where cjt : j ! R+,
njt : j ! [0;nmax], and Kt 2 R+ for each j and t. Here, cjt(j) is the consumption of an age
j household at calendar time t whose skill history up to that point is j. This household’s
date of birth is the end of period t   j. The interpretation of njt(j) is analogous.


























Abusing notation, let V1 i(x) =
P
i 1 V1 i(x;i 1)i 1(i 1).
An allocation is stationary if each (cjt;njt) is independent of t and Kt grows at constant
rate (1 + ).
Markets and Tax Policies. Commodity and factor markets operate as usual: a number
of privately-held ￿rms own the production technology; households rent labor and capital
services to the ￿rms and use the income they receive in return to purchase goods for con-
sumption and investment; and all market transactions are competitive. Let rt denote the
interest rate and wt the price of e￿ective labor.
Insurance markets for skill risk are assumed to be missing however, and this creates room
for the government to enhance social welfare by providing social insurance through income
taxation (broadly de￿ned, so as to include such functionally related arrangements as social
security). Annuity markets are missing as well.
Given the goal of this paper, I allow the government to choose from a very rich set of
tax instruments. Thus, taxes are allowed to be arbitrary non-linear functions of calendar
time, age, income histories, and any other messages received (such as statements pertaining
to unemployment, disability, or retirement). The government can also issue debt, commit
to future actions, and con￿scate any bequests (all of which are accidental in this model).
Following Mirrlees (1971), however, I do not allow taxes to depend directly on households’
4skill levels that realize after date t = 1. It is possible to motivate this restriction by saying
that the government cannot condition taxes on skills because they are unobservable; however
none of what follows hinges on this (or any other) interpretation.
Thus a tax policy is formally a sequence T = ((Mjt;jt)J
j=1;Bt)1
t=1, where Mjt is the set
of messages that an age j household is allowed to send to the government at date t, jt
describes the tax obligation of an age j household at time t as a function of its history hjt (a
complete record of the household’s income and messages sent to the government up to that
date), and Bt is the amount of debt issued by the government in period t. Let T  denote
the set of all tax policies T.
Equilibrium. An equilibrium given a tax policy T and an initial wealth distribution
(ki;1;bi;1)J




t=1, and factor prices (wt;rt)1
t=1 that satisfy the following con-
ditions.
1. The marginal product conditions rt = FK(Kt;Nt)    and wt = FN(Kt;Nt) hold for
each t.
2. The quantities (cj;t+j;nj;t+j;kj+1;t+j+1;bj+1;t+j+1;mj;t+j;hj;t+j)J
j=1 for cohort t  0
























j)) 2 R+  [0;nmax]  R+  Mj;t+j
(4)
for each j and j, given the initial condition k1;t+1(0) = b1;t+1(0) = 0.
3. The quantities (cj;1 i+j(i 1;); nj;1 i+j(i 1;); kj+1;2 i+j(i 1;); mj;1 i+j(i 1;);
hj;1 i+j(i 1;))J
j=i for cohort t = 1 i < 0 households with initial skill history i 1 maximize











5and (4) for each j  i and j, where ki;1(i 1) and bi;1(i 1) are given values which aggregate
to K1 and B1, respectively.












hold for each t.
5. The government’s budget balances for each t:





















where the ￿nal term is revenue from bequest taxation.
Call x = ((cjt;njt)J
j=1;Kt)1
t=1 the equilibrium allocation. An equilibrium is stationary if
its allocation is stationary.
3 Question and Approach
Let us now consider a class of optimal tax problems of the form:
max
T;x
W(x); subject to T 2 T ; x 2 E(T) (5)
where T  T  is a set of tax instruments under consideration, E(T) is the set of equilibrium
allocations under tax policy T, and W is a utilitarian social welfare function that places








In their analysis, CKK focus on a particular set T CKK ( T  under which taxes depend
only on current income as:
jt(hjt) = 
n(wtnjt;'t) + 
art(kjt + bjt); (7)
where n(y;'t)  '0(y   (y '1 + '2t) 1='1) is the Gouveia and Strauss (1994) tax function.
6Each T 2 T CKK is therefore indexed by three parameters ('0;'1;a), and '2t adjusts in each
period so that the government’s budget constraint holds. The level of per capita government
debt is given and no messages are collected. They then solve for the optimal T CKK 2 T CKK,
and ￿nd that the optimal n is essentially a ￿at tax with a ￿xed deduction and that a is
signi￿cantly positive.2
There are theoretical reasons to expect the performance of T CKK to be less than ideal,
however. A general point of course is that setting T = T CKK instead of T = T  in (5)
imposes a restriction on the choice set and hence cannot be welfare-enhancing. But more
speci￿cally, several recent papers have studied the theoretical solution properties of (5) with
T = T  in related models and have concluded that optimality calls for: (i) non-separabilities
in labor and asset income with negative cross partial derivatives, and (ii) history dependence
when skills are serially dependent (Albanesi and Sleet, 2006, Golosov and Tsyvinski, 2006,
Kocherlakota, 2005). Because none of the tax systems in T CKK are allowed to have these
properties, the loss from CKK’s restrictions is strictly positive.
But the question stands: Is the loss from restricting attention to T CKK small or large in
a quantitative sense? If it is small, it would make sense to ignore the above concern for all
practical purposes, given that adding complexity to the tax system will no doubt increase
costs of administration and compliance (neither of which are explicitly modelled here). If it
is large, however, it may make sense to give it due consideration.
To address this question, I perform the following computational experiment. I ￿rst
solve for T CKK and let the economy start in period t = 1 from the associated stationary
equilibrium. Then I consider two policy scenarios. Under the ￿rst, the government keeps
T CKK. Under the second, the government switches to the optimal unrestricted tax system
T  2 T . I ask how much better the latter scenario is according to W, and interpret it as
an answer to the question above.
Of course, implementing this plan requires solving (5) with T = T ￿which I call the
unrestricted optimal tax problem hereafter￿and it is not possible to do so by conduct-
ing a direct numerical search over T . My approach is therefore to simplify the problem
analytically before resorting to numerical methods.
The ￿rst step in this simpli￿cation is to take a mechanism design approach to the problem
following the NDPF, and it is useful to introduce the relevant terminology. Thus, let us
2This description di￿ers somewhat from CKK’s, but the two are mathematically equivalent under a
technical convergence assumption which I will assume throughout: For any T 2 T CKK, there exists an
allocation that maximizes W(x) subject to x 2 E(T) and converges to a stationary allocation. Under this
assumption, one can solve the optimal tax problem (5) under T CKK by choosing a tax system in T CKK
so as to maximize the lifetime utility of a household who is born in the associated stationary equilibrium.
CKK de￿ne their welfare criterion in terms of this procedure. A proof of this easily follows from Lemma 2
in appendix A. See Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) for a closely related discussion.
7say that an allocation x = ((cjt;njt)J
j=1;Kt)1
t=1 is feasible if it satis￿es the following two










The second condition is incentive compatibility for each household. An allocation is incentive













for all reporting strategies (j)J
j=1, where j : j ! j and j = (1;:::;j). Analogously,
























for all reporting strategies (i;j)J
j=i, where i;j : 
j
i ! j, and 
j
i = (i;i;:::;i;j). The
planning problem is then to choose an allocation x so as to maximize social welfare W
subject to feasibility.
Now because any tax-distorted market arrangement is a particular mechanism, it follows
from the revelation principle that no such arrangement can do better than an optimal direct
mechanism, namely a solution x to the planning problem. And because Kocherlakota’s
(2005) implementation result is readily adapted to this setup, we can conclude that x
together with a tax system T  constructed following his approach solves the unrestricted
optimal tax problem.
The remaining task is then to compute x. In doing so, it helps to further simplify the
problem as follows. The starting point is to make the educated guess that the capital-labor
ratio under x will satisfy the golden rule in the long run, which would pin down the long-run
intertemporal shadow price. If so, this would enable us to characterize the long-run behavior
of x as a solution to a collection of ￿partial equilibrium￿ problems that treat each household
separately taking this price as given (Atkeson and Lucas, 1992). And because W e￿ectively
places all ￿weight￿ on the long run, this is plausibly all we need to know about x. This
reasoning suggests the following result:
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j)  0 (12)
for all reporting strategies (j)J












j=1 as t ! 1 together with some tax system T  solves the
unrestricted optimal tax problem, and the maximum value of (10) is the welfare level after
the reform to T .
The formal proof is given in appendix A. Although somewhat lengthy, its core logic
is simple. The starting point is to formulate the planning problem recursively taking the
capital stock and the continuation utilities for all living cohorts as the state variable. The
implied state space is very large, but we can still seek a steady state solution (after suitable
detrending); (10) gives one. The result then follows from a property of undiscounted dynamic
programming problems in which one can transit between any two states within a ￿nite
number of periods.
Given Proposition 1, the task now boils down to solving (10). It is relatively well-known
that this problem has a recursive structure but typically su￿ers from a curse of dimensionality
when skills are serially dependent (Fernandes and Phelan, 2000). However Fukushima and
Waki (2009) show that it is possible to ameliorate this problem considerably once the skill
process is taken to have a particular structure, and this is the route that I will take.
4 Calibration
This section describes the functional forms and parameter values I use in the simulations.
My basic approach is to ￿rst posit a tax policy that resembles the current U.S. system and
then choose the parameters so that the associated stationary equilibrium is consistent with
U.S. data along several dimensions. Appendix B describes my measurement scheme. In the
9discussion I associate parameters with empirical targets in the usual heuristic fashion.
Demographics. A model period stands for one year, and households can live from ages
25 to 100. I set the population growth rate to its data counterpart  = 0:012, and take the
survival rates  j from the U.S. life tables (Arias, Curtin, Wei, and Anderson, 2008).
Technology. The aggregate production function is Cobb-Douglas F(K;N) = KN1 
with capital share  = 0:382, and I set the depreciation rate  = 0:072 so as to hit the 20.6%
investment-output ratio in the data.








As a benchmark I use  = 1 for the relative risk aversion coe￿cient and  = 0:5 for the
Frisch labor supply elasticity. I choose the discount factor  to hit the capital-output ratio
of 3.16 in the data, and set the share parameter  so that hours l = 0:33 on average in the
population.
Skill Process. The skill/wage process has the representation log(j) = ej + zj, where
(ej)J
j=1 is a deterministic age-dependent sequence and (zj)J
j=1 is stochastic. I specify these
components using household-level wage data as follows. First, I regress log real wages on a
cubic polynomial in age and a full set of year dummies. I use the predicted values from the
former component as (ej)J
j=1, and, interpreting the residuals as draws from (zj)J
j=1, compute
their cross-sectional autocovariances Cov (zj;zj i). I next model (zj)J
j=1 as a Markov chain
that discretizes the continuous state model
zj = sj + oj; j = 1;:::;J
sj = sj 1 + j; j  N(0;
2






o); j = 1;:::;J
where ((j;oj)J
j=1;s1) are independent. Here I use two states for both the persistent compo-
nent sj and the transitory component oj, so the process (zj)J
j=1 has four states. (But because
(oj)J
j=1 is transitory, it is possible to formulate the dynamic mechanism design problem (10)

























































































Figure 1: Skill process’s ￿t with its empirical targets.
(;;o;s1) = (0:98;0:13;0:24;0:27) so that the implied Markov chain matches the auto-
covariances Cov(zj;zj i) as well as possible. Figure 1 illustrates the model’s ￿t with the
data. Here the black dashed lines are point estimates from the data, the grey shaded areas
are 95% con￿dence intervals, and the red solid lines are model implications.
In the above, I have used data on wages constructed from data on labor income and
hours. The fact that wages are e￿ectively observable in this fashion may seem to contradict
the idea that the government cannot condition taxes on wages because they are unobservable.
However we can reconcile the two by noting that as long as taxes do not depend directly on
hours/wages, households in the economy have a (weak) incentive to report their hours/wages
truthfully in a survey interview.
Government Policy. The tax system has two components. The ￿rst is a social security
system which imposes a linear tax on labor income and pays out a constant bene￿t to those
above age 65. I set the payroll tax rate to 10.6% and choose the bene￿t level so that the
11Welfare Per capita aggregates Trans.
W Wa Wd WL WH C L N K Y NTC
14% 11% 3% 22% 7% 17% 8% 14% 14% 14% 6
Table 1: Impact of the tax reform.
GDP share of social security bene￿t payments is 3.5%, both as in the data. The second
component is a progressive federal income tax which levies '0(y   (y '1 + '2) 1='1) as a
function of current taxable income y, de￿ned as labor income plus asset income less one
half of social security tax payments. Here, I take the values ('0;'1) = (0:258;0:768) from
Gouveia and Strauss (1994) and let '2 adjust so that the government’s budget constraint
holds. I assume Bt = (1+)t 1B and choose G and B so that the GDP shares of government
expenditures and government debt hit the data values 17.8% and 50.1% respectively.
5 Results
5.1 Welfare Gains
I now simulate the policy reform and quantify its impact on welfare. In setting up the status
quo, I depart from CKK’s original analysis by choosing the level of government debt B
optimally. Doing so brings the status quo capital-labor ratio (close) to the golden rule level,
which allows me to isolate the gains attributable to improved incentives and social insurance
from those due to the classical long-run e￿ects of government debt on capital accumulation
(Diamond, 1965). The status quo policy consists of a 22% ￿at tax on labor income with
a deduction of about 1.2 times median income per household, zero taxes on asset income, 3
and sizable government asset holdings (negative debt) which account for about 85% of the
capital stock.
Table 1 summarizes the impact of the policy reform. Column W reports the welfare gain
in terms of lifetime consumption equivalents, namely the percentage increase in consumption
for all households at all dates and contingencies needed to generate an equivalent welfare
increase (keeping labor supply constant). The number is large by conventional standards.
To highlight the source of this gain, columns C through Y report the long-run percentage
3This di￿erence from CKK’s result is mainly driven by a di￿erence in the preference speci￿cation. Here,
I have assumed a constant Frisch labor supply elasticity, which is known to nullify Erosa and Gervais’s
(2002) case for taxing asset income in OG models (Garriga, 2003). Indeed, when I replicate CKK’s scenario
(keeping B constant at its calibrated value) using my setup I ￿nd that the optimal asset income tax rate is
no more than 5%. The number then goes to zero when B is chosen optimally; this part is consistent with
CKK’s ￿nding that the optimal asset income tax rate declines as B is reduced.
12changes in per capita aggregates. Here, C is consumption, L is hours, N is e￿ective labor
input, K is capital, and Y is output. We can see a large increase in consumption and a
moderate increase in hours. Column Wa reports the welfare gain that is attributable to
these two e￿ects at the aggregate level, namely the gain that would obtain if households in
the status quo were to have their consumption and hours shifted by these amounts at all
dates and contingencies. As we can see, this accounts for much of the total gain.
Distributional e￿ects are critical for physically supporting these improvements in per
capita aggregates, however. Indeed, columns L and N shows that the increase in per capita
e￿ective labor input far surpasses the increase in per capita hours, and this is possible only
because of an e￿ective increase in aggregate productivity that comes from a massive shift
of labor supply toward productive households. The reform thus enlarges the social pie by
motivating productive households to work harder.
In interpreting the above, note that a household in this economy can be productive for
two reasons: because it is of a good age (its age j has a high ej) or because it is of a good
type (it has drawn a high zj). This makes it interesting to examine the extent to which
the productivity gain above is driven by a reallocation of labor supply across ages vis-a-vis




j=1 denote the pre-reform
and post-reform labor supply sequences, respectively, and de￿ne a hypothetical labor supply
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j=1, and (~ lj; ~ nj)J
j=1, respectively. Then we can think of log(N0=L0)   log(N=L) as the
total increase in measured (labor augmenting) TFP following the reform and log( ~ N=~ L)  
log(N=L) as the part of it that is attributable to the shift in labor supply across ages. Under
this decomposition, the total increase in measured TFP is 6%, 1% of which is due to the
reallocation of labor supply across ages. The remaining 5% is attributable to the reallocation
across types.
Finally, columns WL and WH summarize the redistributional e￿ects of the reform by
reporting the gains that households would derive from it if they knew their initial skill levels
in advance. Here, WL is for the lowest initial skill level and WH is for the highest. The
welfare improvement is smaller for those with high initial skills. This is as expected given
that they are working harder after the reform. Nevertheless, both types gain from the reform
and the same is true for the other types in between.
135.2 Pareto Improving Transitions
Because the policy reform induces capital accumulation￿as column K of table 1 shows￿
there is a transition phase during which heavy investment takes place and capital accumulates
at a rapid rate. The welfare analysis above did not take this into account, however.
From a formal, mathematical point of view there is no problem with this: using a balanced
growth path comparison for welfare calculations is justi￿ed by Proposition 1. But if we think
through the economics behind this result, we can see that its validity depends on a peculiar
(and in fact mathematically non-generic) property of of the social welfare function W, namely
that it places zero Pareto weight on any ￿nite number of cohorts. This makes the transition
phase irrelevant for welfare and the ￿optimal transition path￿ indeterminate. Thus, there
are in￿nitely many transition paths that attain the same welfare gain, some of which treat
cohorts born at early dates better than others.
Given this, it would seem useful to ask if there is a transition path that treats all house-
holds in a respectable fashion, say one that Pareto dominates the pre-reform allocation, and
if so, how long it will take. I address these questions below by directly constructing a such
a path. In claiming Pareto dominance, I will be treating households alive in the ￿rst period
with di￿erent skill histories as di￿erent households but those born in the ￿rst period or later
from behind the veil of ignorance.
My starting point is an allocation ~ x under which cohorts born before the reform are
given the status quo consumption-labor pro￿le ( cj;  nj)J




j=1 from Proposition 1, and the capital stock sequence equals that under the post-
reform balanced growth path, (K
t )1
t=1. This allocation satis￿es all of the desired condition
except for resource feasibility￿the initial capital stock  K1 is insu￿cient to support it (i.e.,
 K1 < K
1). But because ~ x makes those cohorts born over the ￿rst several periods strictly
better o￿ than they were under the status quo, it is possible to convert some of their con-
sumption into investment while securing their pre-reform welfare. So a way to proceed is to
check if doing so will su￿ce to make up for the shortage of initial capital.
To this end, I construct a new allocation ^ x by perturbing ~ x as follows. First ￿x H( J)
which indexes the length of the transition, and choose ((jt)J
j=1;Kt)H
t=1 so as to minimize
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if 0  t   j  H   J
c
j(j) if t   j > H   J












    W; 8t = 0;:::;H   J (15)
where KH+1 = K
H+1, ( ~ Nt)H
t=1 is the e￿ective labor sequence under ~ x and W  (  W) is the post-
reform (pre-reform) welfare level. Let ((^ jt)J
j=1; ^ Kt)H
t=1 denote a solution to this problem.
Then de￿ne ^ x by taking ~ x and replacing the consumption for cohorts 0;:::;H   J by ^ cjt =
u 1(u(c
j(j))   ^ jt) and the capital stock for periods 1;:::;H by ( ^ Kt)H
t=1.
In words, this perturbation designates cohorts t = 0;:::;H   J as the ￿heavy investors,￿
whose consumption is reduced relative to (c
j)J
j=1 for the sake of investment. The consumption
reduction takes the form (14) so as to preserve incentive compatibility (Rogerson, 1985),
while the constraint (15) insures that none of these cohorts are made worse o￿ than under
the status quo. Hence ^ x satis￿es all of the desired conditions as long as ^ K1   K1.
Given this, I compute the minimum H for which ^ K1   K1 and report the number of
cohorts required to accomplish the required investment in capital, NTC = H  J +1, in the
last column of table 1. Of course it is straightforward to modify this scheme in a way that
bene￿ts the older cohorts at the cost of having a longer transition.
5.3 Properties of the Unrestricted Optimal Tax System
Motivated by the preceding results, I go on to examine the quantitative characteristics of
the post-reform, optimal unrestricted tax system T  and provide some intuition on how it
generates its incentive e￿ects.
General Structure. I focus on a tax system T  whose construction follows Kocherlakota
(2005) and examine its long run properties, namely those that hold after the capital-labor




from Proposition 1, respectively. I denote the associated factor prices by r  ^ r() and
w  ^ w(), and labor income by y
j  wn
j and yj  (y
i)
j
i=1. I also de￿ne Y j  fyj(j) :
j 2 jg to be the set of labor income histories observed in equilibrium.
For the sake of exposition only, let us assume that there exists (^ cj)J




j(j) = ^ cj(yj(j)) for all j and j. This assumption, which is the counterpart of
Kocherlakota’s (2005) Assumption 1, ensures the existence of a T  which collects no messages
(i.e., Mjt  ;). A violation of this assumption would add complexity to equations (16) and
15(17) below, but would not a￿ect the discussion otherwise.













j are both non-linear functions of the household’s history of labor income
yj  (yi)
j

























j))fyj   ^ cj(y
j)g (17)
for all yJ 2 Y J. As well, a
j (yj) = 1+1=r and n
j (yj) = yj +1 for yj = 2 Y j so as to make
such income histories budget infeasible.
Properties and Interpretation. There is an analytical proof that the asset income tax
rates a
j are zero on average in the cross section (counting bequest taxation as a 100% tax
on the asset stock upon death), and that they therefore generate no revenue (Kocherlakota,
2005). This means that all tax revenue must come from labor income taxes n
j through
either a high marginal tax rate or a large lump sum tax. To see which is the case, let us look



















































































































Figure 2: Summary of labor income tax and labor wedges.
The top left panel of ￿gure 2 represents this relationship using a scatter plot. Here, each
dot corresponds to a skill history J realization and units are normalized on both axes so
that the median value of (19) equals one. If we ￿t a straight line to these dots, the slope is
0.60 and the intercept is -0.55. This suggests that the labor income tax schedules n
j raise
revenue through high marginal rates and use lump sum transfers to provide redistribution
from high income earners to low income earners.
High marginal taxes on labor income may seem to contradict the fact that the tax reform
generates much of its positive e￿ects by improving incentives to work. To examine this point
further, let us ￿rst look at the labor wedges !n














for each j and j, which measures the extent to which labor supply is distorted by the tax
system. The top right panel of ￿gure 2 plots the cross sectional average of !n
j (j) for each





























































Figure 3: Summary of asset income tax.
households, and although it gradually increases with age, it never exceeds 10%. The bottom
two panels of ￿gure 2 summarize the dependence of !n
j on current and past labor income
















j)) + (approx. error);
computed using a large number of skill history J realizations. As we can see, the labor wedge
declines moderately with current labor income, meaning that high labor income earners are
given better incentives to produce on the margin. Its dependence on past labor income, on
the other hand, seems limited.
As noted above, the asset income tax rate a
j is allowed to depend on current and past
labor income, and this feature is essential for reconciling high marginal labor income tax
rates and low labor wedges. This is especially true for the more productive households.


















j)) + (approx. error)
computed using a large number of skill history J realizations. The e￿ect that clearly stands
out is the strong negative relationship between a
j and current labor income y
j: a 1% decline
in the latter is associated with as much as a 4-6% decline in the former. The presence of this
non-separability is consistent with the ￿ndings of Albanesi and Sleet (2006), Golosov and
Tsyvinski (2006), and Kocherlakota (2005), but here it seems helpful to give an alternative
interpretation of its role: it serves as a device for encouraging labor supply by the wealth-
rich, who are relatively old and have had high wages in the past. Because average wages
follow a hump-shaped pattern over the life cycle and shocks to wages are persistent, such
households are more likely to have high current wages than others. This explains how the tax
system manages to keep the labor wedge low for high-wage households and thereby generate
the right incentive e￿ects,4 despite the seemingly high marginal labor income tax rates. The
￿gure also suggests that the asset income tax rate a
j is increasing in previous years’ labor
income, possibly up to 3 years.
6 Tentative Conclusions
The results obtained so far suggest that there is a potentially large gain from employing a
tax system of the kind prescribed by the New Dynamic Public Finance, and that its main
characteristics are the following: (a) tax revenue is generated by a high marginal labor
income tax; (b) redistribution from high income households to low income households is
provided through lump sum transfers; and (c) incentives to work are provided through a
non-separability of the tax function in current labor and asset income.
An important caveat from a practical point of view is that the analysis did not take into
account the additional costs of administration and/or compliance that the tax reform may
induce. It is hard to see how large these costs might be, but Hall and Rabushka (1995)
provide conservative estimates of how costly the current U.S. tax system is for these reasons
and their numbers are by no means small. On the other hand, some optimism derives from
the fact that the optimal non-linear tax requires no more record-keeping than is currently
done by the U.S. Social Security system (which keeps track of all individuals’ labor income
histories). At any rate, providing a serious quanti￿cation of the ￿cost side￿ of the reform
4In parallel work, Kitao (2010) e￿ectively examines this mechanism in isolation by enlarging T CKK in
a way that allows for contemporaneous non-separabilities in labor and asset income. She highlights forces
that are close to those described here.
19remains an important goal for future research.
The most conspicuous shortcoming of the analysis for the time being, however, is that
its characterization of the optimal tax system is only partial. For example, the exact nature
of history dependence in the tax code and its role in generating the welfare gain remain
obscure. At the time of writing it appears di￿cult to make good progress on this front using
a straightforward variant of the mechanism design approach employed here, and in ongoing
work I am therefore exploring an alternative route. The idea is to follow Huggett and Parra
(2010) and seek a tax system: (i) that has a structure that is simple enough to permit the
direct computation of the implied competitive equilibrium; (ii) and is approximately optimal
in the sense that it generates a welfare gain whose size is close to what is attained by the fully
non-linear tax examined here. If successful, this will provide both a (more or less) complete
characterization of the optimal tax system and a laboratory for examining the roles and
quantitative importance of its main features.
A Proof of Proposition 1
We ￿rst observe the following property of W:

























As H ! 1, the ￿rst term on the right hand side converges to zero, while the second term
converges to V1.
To proceed, let us reformulate the planning problem recursively following Fernandes and
Phelan (2000) by introducing a new variable  representing continuation utilities. Formally,
a continuation utility as of age j given (ci;ni)J
i=j, where (ci;ni) : i ! R+  [0;nmax] for



















j 1), where 0 = 0  ;. This de￿nes a mapping j : (ci;ni)J
i=j 7! j. Also















































j 1), (cj;nj;j+1) : j ! R+  [0;nmax]  Rj, j : j 1 ! Rj 1. Finally,
let J+1  0 and J+1;t  0 for all t in what follows. (Note that there is no need to
characterize the subset of Rj 1 to which each j(j 1) must belong, given these terminal
conditions and the fact that we will not be doing any backward induction in this proof.)
For a given initial condition (  K1;( j1)J
j=2), where  K1 2 R+ and  j1 : j 1 ! Rj 1 for
each j, de￿ne the auxiliary planning problem as follows: Choose  = (x;((jt)J
j=1)1
t=1), where
x is an allocation and jt : j 1 ! Rj 1 for each (t;j), to maximize W(x) subject to the












j 1) = 0 (21)
for all (t;j;j;0
j;0
j 1), and the initial conditions (K1;(j1)J
j=2) = (  K1;( j1)J
j=2). Using (21),




t=1 1t for any  satisfying the
constraints. As well, because each njt is bounded and the resource constraint must hold at
each t, we may without loss restrict each cjt, jt, and Kt=(1+)t 1 to be bounded from above
and below by appropriate constants. Let W APP(  K1;( j1)J
j=2) denote the maximum objective
value of this problem as a function of its initial condition. ( W APP(  K1;( j1)J
j=2)   1 if
the constraint set given (  K1;( j1)J
j=2) is empty.)
The following lemma clari￿es the relationship between the auxiliary planning problem
and the planning problem.
Lemma 3. If, for a given  K1,
( j1)
J







21the x-component of a solution to the auxiliary planning problem starting from (  K1;( j1)J
j=2)
solves the planning problem starting from  K1.
Proof. If x satis￿es the given description, it is resource feasible by de￿nition, and is in-
centive compatible by (20), (21), and the one-shot deviation principle. To see that it is
optimal, choose any feasible x = ((cjt;njt)J
j=1;Kt)1
t=1 and de￿ne ((jt)J
j=1)1
t=1 by j;t+j 1 =
j((ci;t+i 1;ni;t+i 1)J
i=j) for each j and t. Then  = (x;((jt)J
j=1)1
t=1) satis￿es the constraints











Let us call ((cj;nj;j)J
j=1;K) a stationary solution to the auxiliary planning problem
if  = (((cjt;njt;jt) = (cj;nj;j))J
j=1;Kt = (1 + )t 1K)1
t=1 solves the auxiliary planning
problem starting from (  K1 = K;( j1 = j)J
j=2).
Lemma 4. Let ((c
j;n
j)J


























j=1;K) is a stationary solution to the auxiliary planning problem.








t = (1 + )t 1K)1
t=1. This satis￿es
resource feasibility by (11), ^ r() = , (23), and Euler’s theorem. It also satis￿es (20) and
(21) by (12) and the de￿nition of (
j)J
j=1.
To verify its optimality, let us ￿rst follow Fernandes and Phelan (2000) and rewrite
the dynamic mechanism design problem in the proposition as: Choose (cj;nj;j)J
j=1, where












j 1) = 0 (25)
for all (j;j;0
j;0
j 1). Under the change of variables with (u(cj);v(nj);j)J
j=1 instead of
(cj;nj;j)J
j=1 as the choice variable, this problem is smooth and concave. Moreover, once
(j)J
j=1 is substituted out as a linear function of (u(cj);v(nj))J
j=1 using (j)J
j=1, the constraint
























































and the complementary slackness conditions hold.




































































It then follows from the previous paragraph that LAPP is maximized at  and that the
complementary slackness conditions hold.
Now suppose  did not solve the auxiliary planning problem, and let  denote a superior








where x and x are the x-components of  and , respectively. This contradicts the
above.
Lemma 5. W APP is a constant function.
Proof. Pick any two initial conditions (  K1;( j1)J
j=2) and (  K0
1;( 0
j1)J
j=2), and let  and 0 solve
the corresponding auxiliary planning problems. Then consider a deviation from  of the
23following form. For the ￿rst H periods set the consumption-labor pro￿les for all newborns
to (cj = 0;nj = nmax)J
j=1. From then on, set them to what they are under 0. For H
su￿ciently large, this together with a capital stock sequence which equals that under 0 for
t  H +1 de￿nes a feasible allocation. Since this deviation equals 0 after a ￿nite number of




It follows that W APP(  K1;( j1)J








j=1;) and x satisfy the conditions in Proposition 1. De￿ne (
j)J
j=1
and K as in Lemma 4. Let W PP(  K1) denote the maximum value of the objective in the












j) and so Vt(x
) ! 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j=2) (by Lemma 4)
= W
APP(  K1;( j1)
J




PP(  K1) (by Lemma 3)
Hence x solves the planning problem.
The following lemma, which is a straightforward adaptation of Kocherlakota (2005),
concludes the proof:
Lemma 7. If x solves the planning problem, there exists a tax system T  such that (T ;x)
solves (5) with T = T .






t=1. For each t, de￿ne C
t and N




factor prices to r
t = FK(K
t ;N
t )  and w
t = FN(K
t ;N
t ). Let M
jt = j and m
jt(j) = j
for each (t;j;j). Let each 






































































































t + 1) otherwise
for each (t;j;j;wtnjt).
I claim that (T ;x) solves the optimal tax problem (5) under T . Since any equilibrium















t=1 is an equilibrium given T . Markets clear and the marginal product con-
ditions hold by construction, so it remains to check that households are optimizing. (The
government’s budget constraint is then implied by Walras’ law). The argument for co-
horts t  0 is the following. If a household chooses (mj;t+j)J
j=1, its labor choice must
satisfy nj;t+j(j) = n
j;t+j((mi;t+i(i))
j
i=1) for all (j;j) so as to be budget feasible. Given







i=1) for all (j;j) is optimal. The conclusion then




Data for aggregate and policy variables are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s National
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) and Fixed Asset Tables (FA), the Federal Reserve
Board’s Flow of Funds Accounts (FOF), the Economic Report of the President (EROP), and
the Social Security Administration’s Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security
Bulletin (SSA).
25The mapping between model and data variables is straightforward for the following:
the population growth rate is that of the civilian non-institutional population of ages 16
and above (EROP B-35); government debt is gross federal debt (EROP B-78); the social
security tax rate is the sum of Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) contribution rates
for employers and employees (SSA 2.A3); and social security bene￿t expenses are those for
the OASI (SSA 4.A1).
For the remaining variables, the mapping generally follows Cooley and Prescott (1995):
capital is the total value of private ￿xed assets (FA 1.1), consumer durables (FA 1.1), in-
ventories (NIPA 5.7.5.A/B), and land (FOF B.100, B.102, B.103); the components of gross
domestic income (NIPA 1.10) are allocated to capital and labor income assuming that factor
shares among the ambiguous components (components other than compensation of employ-
ees, net interest, rental income, and corporate pro￿ts) are the same as those among total
income; service ￿ows from consumer durables are imputed assuming that they yield the same
rate of return as other components of capital; and gross domestic product/income and its
components (NIPA 1.1.5 and 1.10) are adjusted by adding the imputed service ￿ows from
durables to consumption and capital income.
The empirical targets used in the calibration are average values for years 1980-2007 based
on the measurement scheme above.
B.2 Wages
Household-level data on income, labor supply, and age are obtained from the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID), waves 1968-2007. Nominal wages are measured as ratios of
annual labor income to annual hours worked, both head and wife combined. Real wages are
nominal wages de￿ated by the year’s Consumer Price Index. A household’s age is the age of
its head.
For each wave, a household is dropped from the sample if it fails to meet any of the
following criteria: the household belongs to the Survey Research Center sample; its head is
between ages 25 and 60; its head’s age is non-decreasing in calendar time; its nominal wage is
no less than 1/2 of the corresponding year’s federal minimum wage; its annual labor supply
is no less than 520 hours and no more than 10,400 hours; and its income is not top-coded.
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